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SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN,
124 S. CT. 2739 (2004)
FACTS
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Humberto Alvarez-Machain
for prolonging the life of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent in
Mexico, in order to further torture and interrogate him.' The DEA attempted
to work with the Mexican government to bring Alvarez to the United States
to stand trial.2 However, when this proved unsuccessful, the agency
approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize and transport Alvarez
across the Mexican border.3 A group of Mexicans, including petitioner Jose
Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a
motel, and then brought him by private plane to Texas.4 Once he was on
American soil, federal officers arrested him.
5
Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that his seizure
was "outrageous governmental conduct" and that it violated the extratradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico.6 The United States District
Court for the Central District of California agreed, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.7 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding
that Alvarez's "forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal
court. 8 In 1992, the case was tried again, and after the federal government
presented its case, the District Court granted Alvarez's motion for judgment
of acquittal.9
A year later, Alvarez, who had since returned to Mexico, brought
suit against Sosa; Antonia Grate-Bustamante, a Mexican citizen and DEA
operative; five unnamed Mexican civilians; the United States' and four DEA
agents.' Alvarez sued the United States government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA)", seeking damages for false arrest.12 Additionally, he
brought a claim under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 13 against Sosa for a
violation of the law of nations.'
4









10 Id. at 2747.
11 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
12 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2747.
13 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
14 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
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The Central District of California Court dismissed the FTCA claim
but found for Alvarez on the ATS claim, awarding him summary judgment
and $25,000 in damages. 15 The Ninth Circuit, first as a three-judge panel and
then sitting en banc, affirmed the ATS judgment, but reversed the dismissal
of the FTCA claim.' 6  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
clarify the scope of both the FTCA and the ATS. 17
HOLDING
Writing for the Court, Justice Souter held that under the foreign
country exception18 to the FTCA waiver of governmental immunity, the
United States was not liable for an alien's arrest and transport to the United
States by a foreign national.' 9 The Supreme Court also determined that the
foreign country exception bars all claims against the government based on
any injury suffered in a foreign country.2 °
ANALYSIS
In its analysis of the FTCA, the Court examined several relevant
provisions relating to the Act.2' The FTCA grants federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions or claims against the United States for
money damages; injury or loss of property; or personal injury or death if any
employee of the government causes a tort while acting within the scope of
22his office or employment. According to the FICA, the United States can
be held liable for such acts if under the same circumstances, a private person
would be liable to the claimant.23 There are exceptions, however, to this
rule.24 Particularly applicable in this case is the "foreign country exception,"
which exempts the United States from liability for torts committed on foreign




1S Exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000) (enumerating exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, specifically listing an exception to any tort committed on foreign soil).
'9 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746.
20 Id.
21 Id at 2747.
22 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
23 Id.
24 Exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).




"headquarters doctrine,"26 which effectively counteracts the foreign country
exception.27 The headquarters doctrine provides that if acts or omissions
occur in the United States that result in a tort being committed on foreign
soil, the United States is not exempt from liability.28
The Court began by analyzing Alvarez's claim under the FTCA and
the Ninth Circuit's application of the statute.29 The Ninth Circuit had
awarded Alvarez judgment, finding that the foreign country exception did
not apply because it was only tortuous to the extent that it occurred in
Mexico. 30 The Ninth Circuit employed the use of the headquarters doctrine
to override the statutory provision that exempts the United States from
liability for torts committed on foreign soil.31 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the United States could be held liable under the FTCA because although
the abduction occurred in Mexico, it was planned and initiated in the United
States by DEA agents.32 The government sought reversal, arguing that the
foreign country exception should in fact apply in this case.33
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's use of the
headquarters doctrine for three main reasons. 34  First, the practical
implications are far-reaching.35 The Court posited that every tortious claim
arising in a foreign country could be traced back to some negligent activity in
the United States.36 According to the Court, the exception has the potential
to swallow the rule.37 If the Court approved the exception, it could become a
standard part of FTCA litigation falling under the foreign country
exception.8
Second, the Court examined the chain of proximate causation
leading up to the tortious act.39 There must be a "plausible proximate nexus"
between the acts occurring in the United States and the resulting harm in the
foreign country.4 However, the mere existence of a chain of causation does
26 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2748 (citing Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(refusing to apply § 2608(k) where a communiqu6 sent from the United States by a federal law





31 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (stating exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act include any
claim arising in a foreign country)).
32 Id. at 2748-49.





38 Id. (citing Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
39 Id.
40 Id. (citing Eaglin v. United States, Dept. of Army, 794 F.2d 981,983 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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not necessarily mean the foreign country exception cannot be applied.41
Here, the Court concluded that although the DEA agents in California could
be viewed as part of the chain of causation, there were other causes as well.42
Ultimately, the claim arose from harm proximately caused in Mexico.43 The
Court determined that the events in the United States were too attenuated to
be the direct cause of the harm.44
Third, the Court determined that in drafting the foreign country
exception, Congress intended for the language "arising in" a foreign country
to bar application of the headquarters doctrine. 45 When the FTCA was
enacted, the term "arising in" was in common usage.46 The term generally
referred to state borrowing statutes, which directed the courts to the
applicable law for causes of action arising with transjurisdictional facts.47 In
1962, there was a shift in thinking, and many courts held that a cause of
action for tort arises in the jurisdiction "where the last act necessary to
establish liability occurred," or "the jurisdiction in which the injury was
received." 48 Furthermore, lex loci delicti (the law of the place where the tort
was committed) 49 was the dominant conflict of laws principle applied in tort
cases at the time the FTCA was passed.50 Examining the legislative history
surrounding the drafting of the FTCA, the Court determined that Congress
wanted to prevent United States courts from applying this principle in cases
involving foreign matters.5'






47 Id. The Court explained that at the time the FTCA was passed, the general rule regarding
borrowing statutes was that "a cause of action arising in another jurisdiction, which was barred by the
laws of that jurisdiction, will [also] be barred in the domestic courts." Id. (citing 41 A.L.R. 4TH 1025,
1029, § 2 (1985), available at 1985 WL 287457). In general, if a cause of action in another jurisdiction
was barred by the laws of that jurisdiction, it would be barred in the domestic courts. Id. Additionally,
application of the statutes was generally restricted to situations in the State "where [the] cause of action
arose, or accrued, or originated." Id. (citing 75 A.L.R. 203, 211 (1931)) (emphasis in original).
48 Id. (citing Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L.REV. 33,
47). Although all courts do not uniformly agree on this principle, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1969) encourages the general shift towards using flexible balancing analysis to
inform choice of law, where there is a default rule for tort cases rooted in the traditional approach. Id. at
2753. Under this Restatement, tort liability is determined "by the local law of the state which ... has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties," taking into account the place of the injury,
where the conduct causing the injury occurred, and other factors, including the domicile, residence, and
nationality of the parties Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969).
49 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (7th ed. 1999).
so Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2750.
51 Id. at 2752.
[Vol. 1 1:263
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There were additional reasons for rejecting the headquarters
doctrine.52 The Court postulated that its application in these circumstances
would render the foreign country exception meaningless and would be
contrary to the drafters' intentions.53  Additionally, the current judicial
system favors a greater flexibility in choice-of-law methodology, rejecting
54the traditional form of choice-of-law analysis.   Finally, there would be a
great degree of variance in the application of the headquarters doctrine by the
several states. Thus, the Court reasoned that it was unlikely Congress
intended such a possibility. 56 Combining these considerations with its other
determinations, the Court found that the headquarters doctrine did not apply
and that the foreign country exception to the FICA was applicable in this
case.
57
The Court next considered Alvarez's claim against Sosa under the
Alien Tort Statute, in which he argued that the ATS was intended both as a
jurisdictional grant and as authority for the creation of a new cause of action
58for torts in violation of international law. Sosa, supported by the United
States, argued that the ATS vests only federal courts with jurisdiction.59
The Court found Alvarez's interpretation of the statute
"implausible." 60 According to the Court, the ATS, as enacted in 1789, did not
give the district courts the power to make substantive law but merely granted
district courts original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort
61committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.




54 Id. at 2752-53 (citing Gary J. Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the United States:
Notes on Rereading Von Mehren, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 125 (2003), claiming that the traditional
approach to choice of substantive tort law has lost favor and stating "[t]he traditional methodology of
place of wrong ... has receded in importance, and new approaches and concepts such as governmental
interest analysis, most significant relationship, and better rule of law have taken center stage").
55 Id. at 2754.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2754-55. The framers of the Constitution drafted the ATS in response to the Continental
Congress's inability to punish violations of the law of nations, vesting the Supreme Court with original
jurisdiction over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls" and reinforcing
the Court's original jurisdiction in such cases with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 79. Id. at 2756-57(citing U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, 1 Stat. 80, ch. 20, § 13, § 11, § 9. See
generally Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 15-21 (1985); W. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 27-53 (1995)).
59 Id. at 2754.
60 Id. at 2755.
61 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)).
62 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79, §9(b) (1789).
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as well as the text itself, and concluded that the drafters would have included
a statutory cause of action if they had so desired.63
In determining the current state of the ATS, the Court considered
two theories.64  The first, proffered by Sosa, was that the ATS was
ineffective because no statute expressly empowered courts to authorize a
cause of action for a claim of relief.65 Another theory, advanced by Amici
professors of federal jurisdiction and legal history, maintained that once a
jurisdictional grant was on the books, federal courts could hear the claim,
because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized
66within the common law of the time. The Court favored this second
interpretation, finding that "the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the
sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with
a certain subject.67
Although the Court conceded that the exact intent behind the
framing of the ATS was unclear, certain propositions did provide historical
68support for its position. First, the Court reasoned that Congress would not
draft the ATS as having no immediate practical use.69 Second, by looking to
legislative history, the Court inferred that Congress intended the ATS to
provide jurisdiction to only a small set of actions alleging violations of the
law of nations, including offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe
conduct, and individual actions arising out of piracy.70 The Court found that
these propositions were further reinforced by case law.71
The Court then addressed Sosa's objections regarding the application
of the ATS. n Citing legislative history, Sosa argued that the ATS was not
meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived
from the law of nations.73 First, Sosa pointed to the Continental Congress's
1781 recommendation to state legislatures to pass laws authorizing such
63 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. (citing Brief for Vikram Amar et al. as Amici Curiae).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2758.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2759.
71 Id. The Court considered the 1795 opinion of Attorney General William Bradford, which
stated his view that in a situation regarding Americans committing tortious acts abroad, he was uncertain
about the availability of criminal prosecution, but a federal court was open for the prosecution of a tort
action. Id. See also Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (D.S.C. 1795) (assuming the ATS was a
jurisdictional basis for the court's action regarding admiralty jurisdiction); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. 942 (No. 9,895) (D. Pa. 1793) (finding a claim for both tort and property was not proper under the
ATS).




suits. 74 The Court, however, disagreed, finding that the relationship between
positive law and common law in the 18th century was complementary, as the
common law was frequently reinforced by positive law.75 Second, Sosa
argued that there was no familiar set of legal actions for the exercise of
jurisdiction under the ATS.76  The Court rejected this objection as well.7 7
Looking again to legislative history, the Court concluded that "Congress did
not intend the ATS to sit on the shelf until some future time when it might
enact further legislation.
7 8
The Court found that although the ATS does not create any new
causes of action, it was meant to have practical effect when it became a
law.79 This effect was achieved through the common law, which provided a
cause of action for the small number of international law violations that were
potentially tortious.8°
This finding, however, was conditioned by the Court's advocacy of
judicial restraint with regard to any future ATS claims.8' Before hearing
individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction granted by § 1350 of
82the ATS, courts should consider that common law has changed since
1789.83  In courts today, there is a general understanding that law is
legislatively made, not discovered.84 The Court worried that in hearing such
claims under the ATS, there is a potential danger that courts will intrude on
international policy, which is not within the purview of the judicial branch.
85
Because the legislature is in a better position to monitor foreign policy and to
create a private right of action and there has been a shift in the role federal
courts play in making common law, 86 the Court advised the exercise of
87judicial caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2760.
76 Id. (citing Blackstone's treatise mentioning violations of the law of nations as occasions for
criminal remedies in comparison to the ATS's mention of "tort").
77 Id.
78 Id. at 2761. The Court examined a 1781 Resolution of the Continental Congress
recommending the States to vindicate rights under the law of nations and provide punishment for the
violation of safe passage of ambassadors and other public officials. Id. at 2756 (citing 21 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1136-1137 (G. Hunt ed. 1912)). Additionally, the Court looked again to
the 1795 Bradford opinion, supra note 71, at 2759).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2761-62.
82 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
83 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)(establishing the principle that in diversity
cases, federal courts must apply the law that would be applied by the courts of the state in which they sit;
courts are not free to decide for themselves the right rule of consideration (Erie, 304 U.S. at 79).
87 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764.
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In assessing Alvarez's claim, the Court determined that limited
judicial recognition of claims regarding international laws violations should
apply, provided the norm is not sufficiently definite to support a cause of
action.88 In other words, unless the international laws are very clear, United
States courts should not make judicial determinations of claims made under
the ATS. 89 Additionally, if a claim is heard, the determination should
consider the practical effects that may result from making that cause
available in the federal courts.
90
Using these principles, the Court found that Alvarez's detention
claim must be framed within the context of current international laws.9' The
Court found that if there is no treaty, controlling executive act or legislative
act, or judicial decision, the court must then turn to the "customs and usages
of civilized nations. ' 92 The Court examined Alvarez's first argument that, as
defined under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration"),
93
his abduction by Sosa was an "arbitrary arrest. 9 4 The Court determined that
the Declaration does not impose obligations as a matter of international
law.95 The Court also rejected Alvarez's claim against arbitrary arrest under
Article Nine of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
96
Although the court noted that the Covenant does bind the United States as a
matter of international law; the United States ratified the document with the
understanding that it was not self-executing. 97 Thus, the Covenant could not
create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.98
The Court unequivocally found that neither the Declaration nor the
Covenant can establish the relevant rule of international law, despite
Alvarez's claim that the prohibition of arbitrary arrest had attained the status
of binding customary international law. 99 Because he cited little authority
that such a broad rule is a binding customary norm, the Court accorded
88 Id. at 2765-66.
89 Id. at 2766-67.
90 Id. at 2767.
91 Id.
92 Id. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (finding that the works of jurists and
commentators on the subject of international law are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what
the law really is).
93 GAOR 217A (HI), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
94 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767.
95 Id. (citing Humphrey, The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39, 50 (E. Luard ed. 1967)).
96 Id. (citing GAOR 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976)).





Alvarez's claim little weight.'0° Additionally, the Court postulated that
adopting such a rule would affect federal court claims, especially claims
pertaining to the Fourth Amendment and claims against state officers.'01
Finally, the Court looked to the language of the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law,10 2 which asserts that a state violates international law
only if it "practices, encourages, or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary
detention." 9(° The Court found that "a single illegal detention of less than a
day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment," does not violate an international law and does not require a
remedy in tort.' °4
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, offered the first of three concurring opinions.10 5 Justice Scalia
agreed with most of the Court's opinion but found the reservation of power
in the federal judiciary to create causes of action to enforce international
laws unnecessary.' °6 He distinguished his opinion based on the fact that after
the Court concluded that the ATS did not create a new cause of action, it
addressed the compelling reasons to maintain restraint in considering any
new cause of action. °7 According to Justice Scalia, this bypasses the
question of authority and "neglects the lesson of Erie" that because a court
has a grant of jurisdiction does not mean it has law-making authority.'0 8 He
opined that the employment of discretionary authority to enforce the law of
nations effectively creates new federal common law.' °9 Disagreeing with
this principle, as it has already been answered with Erie, he posited that the
Court's opinion invites the lower courts to create a cause of action that
Congress has not. 1 0 According to him, such an action would encroach upon
Congressional power."' Justice Scalia maintained that the federal judiciary
does not and should not have the power to fill a judicial lawmaking rule. 1
2
100 Id. at 2767, 2768.
101 Id.
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
103 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2770.
107 Id. at 2772.
108 Id.
1o9 Id. at 2773.
110 Id. at 2774.
III Id.
112 Id. at 2769.
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Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment.' 3 However, Justice Ginsburg stipulated that she
would have taken a different route in examining Alvarez's FTCA claim.
14
Although she agreed that the foreign country exception was applicable here,
she would have read the § 2680(k) provision of the FTCA as signaling the
"place where the act or omission occurred," not the "place of injury."'' 5
Furthermore, she distinguished the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
FTCA as entangling questions of law with the potential liability of the
United States for torts committed in other countries." 6 She would have
construed the foreign country exception "in harmony with the FTCA's
sovereign-immunity waiver...which refers to the place where the negligent
or intentional act occurred."'"17  According to Justice Ginsberg, the "last
significant act or omission" rule applied under § 2680(k) would suppress any
headquarters doctrine claim." 8  Since Mexico was the site of the last
significant act in this case, Mexico would be the place where the tortious act
arose and the United States would remain immune from liability.11 9
Justice Breyer also concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment. 20 His special concern was "whether the exercise of jurisdiction
under the ATS is consistent with those notions of comity that lead each
nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of
its laws and their enforcement."' 2  He reasoned that these concerns arise
when foreign persons are injured abroad and bring suit in the United States
under the ATS, asking the court to recognize that certain conduct violates
international norms.12 2  Furthermore, although there was procedural
consensus among international courts regarding other matters, none exists to
support the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. 123 According to Justice
Breyer, this lack of consensus further supports the Court's conclusion that
the ATS did not recognize Alvarez's claim.124
13 Id. at 2776.
114 Id.
15 Id.
116 Id. at 2778.
117 Id.
"1 Id. at 27 81.
19 Id.
120 Id. at 2782.
121 Id.
122 Id.





In evaluating the FTCA claim, the Court declared that the
headquarters doctrine does not apply when establishing the potential liability
of the United States for torts committed in a foreign country. 25 The Court
found that the cause of action for a tort arises in the jurisdiction "in which the
injury was received.', 126 In rejecting the application of the headquarters
doctrine, the Court noted the practical implications surrounding such a
determination. 27 According to the Court, if the headquarters doctrine was
applied, "every tortious claim arising in a foreign country could be traced
back to some negligent activity in the United States."' 28 While the Court
cites examples of slip-and-fall cases or medical malpractice claims, 29 even
more prevalent is the consideration of collateral damage resulting from the
current War on Terror. The United States government could be potentially
liable for any wrongful death or injury resulting from our actions around the
world, especially regarding the civilian casualties in such places as Iraq and
Afghanistan. It would not be difficult to prove that the planning stages and
initial actions in the chain of proximate cause occurred in the United States.
The judicial analysis in this case precludes such claims from arising from our
actions in foreign countries.
Unlike the FTCA claim, however, the determination of the ATS
claim did leave the door open to further exploration.' 30  While the Court
definitively concluded that the headquarters doctrine does negate the foreign
country exception under the FTCA, it left some room for interpretation in its
ATS analysis, specifically with respect to violations in situations where
international law is well-settled. 3'
Under this analysis, the detention situation at Guantanamo Bay is of
particular concern right now. Currently, over five hundred detainees are
being held. 32 None of them has been accorded Prisoner of War (POW)
status. 33 In a 2002 article, George H. Aldrich discussed the decision behind
refusing POW status to the detainees.'3 According to Aldrich, President
Bush determined that the position of the United States was that "the 1949
M2 Id. at 2750.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2749.
128 Id.
129 id.
130 Id. at 2764.
131 Id.
132 Neil A. Lewis, Scrutiny of Review Tribunals as War Crimes Trials Open, N.Y. TuMEs, Aug.
24, 2004, at A12.
133 George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96
AM. J. INT'L L 891,892 (2002).
134 Id.
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Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, to which both
Afghanistan and the United States are parties, applies to the armed conflict in
Afghanistan between the Taliban and the United States."'' 35 However, these
provisions do not apply to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere
between Al Qaeda and the United States. 36  Furthermore, according to
President Bush's expressed policies, 137 neither Taliban nor captured Al
Qaeda personnel are entitled to POW status, though they are to be treated
humanely and in a manner consistent with the general principles of the
Convention. 138 However, neither President Bush nor his administration has
published any justification or legal defense for these positions.
39
By refusing to accord the detainees POW status, the United States is
acting against several treaties to which it is a party, including the Third
Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts ("Protocol"). t40 The Protocol
provides specific protections for persons who have taken part in hostilities.'
4'
According to Section II, article 45, part 1, "a person who takes part in
hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be presumed to
be a prisoner of war.' 42 Furthermore, if there is any doubt as to whether the
person is entitled to POW status, he shall be accorded such status until "such
time as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal" (emphasis
added). 143 This also holds true if a person is not granted POW status but is to
be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities; in such a situation, the
Protocol states that "he shall have the right to assert his entitlement to
prisoner-of-war status before a judicial tribunal and to have that question
adjudicated."144
Unfortunately, there is doubt regarding the competency of the
tribunals the United States government is slowly assembling.145 According
35 Id. at 891.
136 Id. at 892.
137 Aldrich, supra note 133, at 891-892. On February 7, 2002, President Bush's Press Secretary
announced that the President had decided that the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of POW's
would apply to the conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the United States, but not to the
conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere between Al Qaeda and the United States; he also determined that
neither captured Taliban personnel nor captured Qaeda personnel are entitled to POW status, though they
are to be treated humanely and consistently with the general principles of the convention. Id.
138 Aldrich, supra note 133, at 892.
139 Id.
140 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1978, Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, vol. I (1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
141 Id. at 143.
142 Id. at 144.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 US: Military Commissions Lack Fair Trial Protections, Human Rights News, at
http://hrw.org.english/docs/2004/08/19usdom925.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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to Human Rights Watch, the military commissions at the Guantanamo Bay
trials "lack key fair trial protections," including general standards for
admissibility of evidence, access to attorneys, and right of appeal to a
civilian court.
46
In Sosa, the Court left open the possibility that a claim could be
brought under the ATS in an area of clear and established international
law. 147 Regarding the current detention situation at Guantanamo Bay, the
Geneva Conventions and the subsequent protocols provide clear guidelines
for the treatment of combatants taken into custody during a hostile
conflict. 48 The government's denial of POW status is not supported by any
clear legal principle. 49 The Court determined that the door was not shut
firmly by Erie, but that an opening exists when international law is clear. 5°
The international law governing this situation is clear and established.'
15
Furthermore, the United States is a signatory to the doctrine. 52  Recent
revelations illustrate this fact, including the ruling by Judge Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly which determined that the terror suspects must be allowed to meet
with lawyers, rejecting the Bush administration's argument that the detainees
are not entitled to lawyers. 53 In the aftermath of the War on Terror, it is not
unlikely that future claims brought under the ATS will appear in U.S. courts.
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